How Negative Emotion Enhances the Visual Specificity of a Memory by Kensinger, Elizabeth A et al.
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Kensinger, Elizabeth A., Rachel J. Garoff-Eaton, and Daniel L.
Schacter. 2007. How negative emotion enhances the visual
specificity of a memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
19(11): 1872-1887.
Published Version doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.11.1872
Accessed February 18, 2015 7:30:54 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3622259
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAHow Negative Emotion Enhances the Visual
Specificity of a Memory
Elizabeth A. Kensinger
1,2, Rachel J. Garoff-Eaton
2,3,
and Daniel L. Schacter
2,3
Abstract
& Some studies have suggested that emotion primarily in-
creases memory for ‘‘gist,’’ and does not enhance memory for
detail. There are, however, some instances in which negative
objects (e.g., snake, grenade) are remembered with more visual
detail than neutral objects (e.g., barometer, blender). In the
present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study,
we examined the encoding processes that lead a person to
remember the exact visual details of negative and neutral
objects, and to remember which of two decisions were made
about the objects (a size decision or an animacy decision). The
enhancement in memory for a negative item’s visual details
appeared to result from enhanced visual processing: The right
fusiform gyrus, a region known to be critical for processing
exemplar-specific details, showed a greater extent and magni-
tude of activity during the successful encoding of negative
objects. Activity in the right amygdala also corresponded with
memory for visual detail, although it did not relate to memory
for the task performed with the item. These data provide strong
evidence that engagement of some amygdalar regions can
correspond with enhanced memory for certain types of details,
but does not ensure successful encoding of all contextual
details. &
INTRODUCTION
Individuals often claim to remember emotional experi-
ences with rich detail. Laboratory studies repeatedly have
demonstrated that people are more likely to report vivid
recollections of emotional events than of nonemotional
ones (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Dewhurst & Parry,
2000; Ochsner, 2000). Despite the subjective vividness
associated with emotional experiences, however, numer-
ousstudieshaverevealedthatemotiondoes notenhance
memory for all types of detail. Rather, emotion often has
focal effects on memory, with only some aspects of an
experience more likely to be remembered because of
its emotional content (see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004;
Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002 for recent reviews). For ex-
ample, Adolphs and colleagues have shown that emotion
can enhance memory for the ‘‘gist’’ or general theme
of presented information, but can reduce memory for
details (Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003;
Adolphs, Denburg, & Tranel, 2001). They also have pro-
videdevidencethatthesemnemoniceffectsaremediated
by the amygdala: Individuals with amygdala damage
do not show these gist-enhancing and detail-impairing
effects of emotion on memory (Adolphs, Tranel, &
Buchanan, 2005).
Not all effects of emotion on memory, however, are
explained by this gist versus detail framework. Emotion
sometimes can enhance the visual specificity with which
information is remembered: Individuals are better at dis-
tinguishing ‘‘same’’ from ‘‘similar’’ object exemplars when
t h o s ee x e m p l a r sa r en e g a t i v et h a nw h e nt h e ya r en e u t r a l
(Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006, 2007), suggest-
ing that individuals are more likely to remember exactly
what a negative object looked like when presented at
study.
The primary goal of the present study was to examine
the neural processes that lead to this enhancement in
memory for the visual details of negative objects. A grow-
ing number of neuroimaging studies have attempted
to elucidate the neural processes that contribute to
memory specificity for neutral items (for reviews, see
Schacter, Gallo, & Kensinger, 2007; Schacter, Dobbins, &
Schnyer, 2004), but there is a virtual absence of such
research concerning emotionally arousing stimuli. Prior
research examining participants’ abilities to remember
the visual details of neutral items has revealed a critical
role of the right fusiform gyrus. Activity in the right
fusiform gyrus corresponds with subsequent memory
for the exact visual details of a studied object (e.g., being
able to identify not only that an umbrella had been
studied, but also to identify which particular umbrella
had been studied; Garoff, Slotnick, & Schacter, 2005),
consistent with previous findings suggesting that the
right fusiform gyrus is important for the processing of
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Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003; Koutstaal
et al., 2001; Marsolek, 1999). Based on this prior litera-
ture, we hypothesized that activity in the right fusiform
gyrus would correspond with enhanced visual specificity
for negative objects as well as for neutral ones.
The critical question was whether amygdala activity at
encoding also would correspond with memory for visual
detail. The amygdala often has been shown to modulate
sensory functioning (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Davis
& Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 1995). Individuals are more
likelytodetectemotionalthanneutralobjectsinvisualar-
rays (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) or to identify emo-
tional compared to neutral stimuli presented only briefly
(Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Anderson & Phelps,
2001), and recent neuroimaging data have suggested that
these effects are due to interactions between the amyg-
dala and the fusiform gyrus (e.g., Noesselt, Driver,
Heinze,&Dolan, 2005; Vuilleumier,Richardson, Armony,
Driver, & Dolan, 2004) and between the amygdala and
the occipital cortex (e.g., Tabert et al., 2001). Although
these studies have shown a link between amygdala ac-
tivity and sensory processing, they have not revealed
whether connections between the regions influence the
visual specificity of a memory. In fact, there has been
significant debate about whether amygdala engagement
would correspond with enhanced or reduced visual spec-
ificity: Although it might seem intuitive that such con-
nections would enhance visual specificity, a couple of
studies have shown stronger relations between activity in
visual processing regions and the successful encoding
or retrieval of neutral as compared to emotional informa-
tion (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004; Sharot, Delgado, &
Phelps, 2004). Although these studies have not examined
thevisualspecificityofamemory,theyraisetheintriguing
possibility that the ability to remember visual information
may be reduced, rather than enhanced, by emotion.
Moreover,studiesbyAdolphsetal.(2005)havesuggested
that amygdala engagement may impair, rather than en-
hance, the ability to encode specific visual details (see
review by Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002). However, our
study differed from those of Adolphs and colleagues in
an important way: In the present study, participants were
asked to remember the visual details of the emotional
itemsthemselves(e.g.,torememberwhatasnakelooked
like), whereas in the studies by Adolphs and colleagues
(e.g., Adolphs et al., 2001, 2005; Denburg et al., 2003),
participants often were asked to remember the details of
information peripheral to the emotional content of the
scene or story (e.g., to remember where on the branch
the snake was perched, or what the forest looked like).
We have shown previously that individuals are better able
to remember the visual details of negative objects than of
neutral ones (Kensinger et al., 2006, 2007), and we hy-
pothesizedthatamygdala–fusiforminteractionswouldbe
likely to underlie the enhancing effects of negative emo-
tion on memory specificity.
The secondary goal of the present study was to
examine the mechanisms through which negative emo-
tion exerts focal effects on memory. Prior studies have
revealed that amygdala activity does not always corre-
spond with subsequent memory for details: Although
amygdala activity is associated with the ability to remem-
ber whether a negative item was seen or imagined
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2005a, 2005b), it does not relate
to the ability to remember which decision was made
about a negative or positive item (Kensinger & Schacter,
2006a). We expected to replicate within a single study
these focal effects of amygdala activity on memory for
detail. We hypothesized that amygdala activity would be
related to the encoding of details that are intrinsically
linked to the negative item itself (e.g., its physical ap-
pearance) but not to elements peripheral or extrinsic to
the item (e.g., the task performed with the item; see
Mather et al., 2006; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006a for
further discussion).
By assessing memory for two different types of detail
within the same experiment, the current study also
could examine whether there were particular neural pro-
cesses that corresponded both with the ability to re-
member intrinsic details of a negative item and also with
the inability to remember an extrinsic detail of that
item’s presentation. To the extent that the focal effects
of emotion on memory arise from encoding processes
(e.g., attention toward features directly tied to the
emotional item), we would expect to see activity that
would both facilitate the successful encoding of the
intrinsic details of an emotional item and impede en-
coding of a more extrinsic detail regarding the item’s
presentation. An open question was whether this activity
would be within the standard fronto-parietal network
that guides attention toward any task-relevant stimuli, or
whether this network would instead include regions
specifically tuned to the processing of emotional infor-
mation (e.g., orbito-frontal cortex).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-one native English-speaking adults participated
in this study. The data from one participant were
excluded due to scanner malfunction. The remaining
20 participants (10 women) ranged in age from 19 to
31 years (mean age = 22 years). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and all were
screened to exclude those with any contraindicators
for MRI scanning, or with any history of neurological
trauma or psychiatric disorder. No participant reported
taking any medications that affected the central nervous
system. Informed consent was obtained from all partic-
ipants in a method approved by the Harvard University
and Massachusetts General Hospital Institutional Review
Boards.
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Materials comprised 386 pairs of colored, nameable photo
objects (Hemera Technologies, 2002, Canada), sized to
300 pixels in their largest dimension. Pairs of objects were
selected so that the two items of a pair shared the same
verbal label (e.g., were both umbrellas) but differed in
other perceptual features (e.g., color, shape, size, orienta-
tion). Object pairs were those used in Kensinger et al.
(2006); as described in that paper, half of the pairs had
been rated by participants as negative and arousing, and
half had been rated as neutral and nonarousing. Pairs also
had been selected to assure that the negative and neutral
item pairs were matched for the overall similarity of the
two items, the dimensions (color, size, shape, orientation)
that differed between the two items, and the familiarity
of the items.
Study Procedure
While in the functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) scanner, participants were presented with 304
nameable, colored objects.Theseobjectswerepresented
across four lists, with each list containing 76 items (half
negative, half neutral). Each item was presented for 1 sec.
For half of the items, participants made a size decision
about whether each object, in the real world, would fit
inside a filing cabinet drawer. For the other half of the
objects, participants decided whether the object was a
living thing. Participants were cued as to which decision
to make by the prompts ‘‘Living?’’ or ‘‘Fit?’’. These
prompts appeared above the object. Participants were
asked to make their decision as quickly as possible. There
were no reaction time differences in the time it took
participants to make the decision for the negative and
neutral objects. Following the item’s presentation, a
fixation cross (+) was presented for a variable duration
(range of 5–13 sec) to provide jitter (Dale, 1999).
Test Procedure
Outside of the scanner, after approximately a 30-min
delay, participants performed a surprise object recogni-
tion task. On the recognition task, participants were
presented with 380 objects: 152 objects (76 negative,
76 neutral) were identical to those that had been stud-
ied (same objects), 152 objects (76 negative, 76 neutral)
shared the same verbal label as a studied item but that
differed in color, size, shape, or orientation (similar ob-
jects), and 76 objects were new (38 negative, 38 neutral;
Figure 1). Each object appeared in the center of the
computer screen, with a prompt below indicating that
participants should indicate, by keypress, whether the
item was ‘‘same,’’ ‘‘similar,’’ or ‘‘new.’’
When participants gave a ‘‘same’’ or a ‘‘similar’’ re-
sponse to an item on the recognition memory task, they
were indicating that they had seen that type of item
before (e.g., that they had seen a toaster on the study
list). In these instances, the participants were then asked
to indicate which task they had performed with the
item (i.e., whether they had decided if the toaster was
living or if the toaster would fit in a drawer). It is rea-
sonable for participants to know that they saw a partic-
ular type of item (e.g., a toaster) and to know the task
that they performed with that item (e.g., that they de-
cided whether the toaster would fit in a drawer) and yet
to be incorrect about the visual details of that toaster
(e.g., to give a ‘‘similar’’ rather than a ‘‘same’’ response
to a same toaster). Conversely, participants can be cor-
rect about the visual details of a studied item (e.g., can
correctly give a ‘‘same’’ response to a same toaster) and
yet can be incorrect about the task performed with the
item. When participants gave a ‘‘new’’ response, they
were indicating no memory for that type of object. Thus,
in instances where a ‘‘new’’ response was given, partic-
ipants were not asked to indicate what task they had
performed with the item (because, by definition, a ‘‘new’’
response meant that the participant believed that they
had never studied the item).
The member of the object pair that was included on
the recognition task was held constant for all partic-
ipants; the items presented at study and the task per-
formed with each study item were counterbalanced
between participants to manipulate the condition of
each object shown at recognition. An equal proportion
of studied items was tested as same and as similar
exemplars to avoid biasing participants’ responses to
the test exemplars. However, the neuroimaging analyses
focus on participants’ encoding of items that were later
tested with the same exemplar. Participants’ responses
to same items are straightforward to interpret: A ‘‘same’’
response to a same item reflects memory for the specific
visual details of a studied item (i.e., the ability to know
that the exemplar tested is exactly the same exemplar
that was studied); a ‘‘similar’’ response indicates mem-
ory for the general type of item but not for its exact
visual details (otherwise, the participant should know
that the test exemplar is the ‘‘same’’ as the studied one);
and a ‘‘new’’ response reflects complete forgetting of
the item’s presentation. Task-correct or task-incorrect
decisions also are clear-cut in the case of the same items.
Either a person correctly remembers the task performed
with the studied item, or he does not. In contrast, in-
terpretation of responses to items tested as similar ex-
emplars is more difficult to interpret; for example, a
‘‘similar’’ response to a similar exemplar could reflect
memory for specific visual details (e.g., a participant
c o u l dr e m e m b e re x a c t l yw h a tt h es t u d i e du m b r e l l a
looked like, and therefore could know that the tested
exemplar is not the same) or it could reflect memory for
only the general item type (e.g., a participant could
remember that an umbrella was studied but, having no
memory for its visual details, indicate that the umbrella
was ‘‘similar’’ to the studied one). It also is more difficult
1874 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 19, Number 11to interpret task-correct and task-incorrect assignments
for the similar exemplars because, in reality, the person
was never asked to perform any task with that exact
exemplar.
Image Acquisition and Data Analysis
Images were acquired on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra MRI
scanner. Detailed anatomic data were acquired using a
multiplanar rapidly acquired gradient-echo (MP-RAGE)
sequence. Functional images were acquired using a T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR =
2000 msec, TE = 30 msec, FOV = 200 mm; flip angle =
908). Twenty-eight axial–oblique slices (3.2 mm thick-
ness, 0.6 mm skip between slices), aligned along the
anterior commissure/posterior commissure line, were
acquired in an interleaved fashion.
All preprocessing and data analysis were conducted
within SPM99 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neu-
rology). Standard preprocessing was performed on the
functional data, including slice-timing correction, rigid
body motion correction, normalization to the Montreal
Neurological Institute template (resampling at 3 mm
cubic voxels), and spatial smoothing (using an 8-mm
full-width half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel).
For each participant, and on a voxel-by-voxel basis, an
event-related analysis was first conducted in which all
instances of a particular event type were modeled
through convolution with a canonical hemodynamic
response function. All participants had at least 15 in-
stances of every modeled event type. Effects for each
event type were estimated using a subject-specific, fixed-
effects model. These data were then entered into a
second-order, random-effects analysis.
Random-effects contrast analyses contrasted activa-
tion as a function of subsequent memory performance
(e.g., later remembered with detail, later remembered
without detail, later forgotten) separately for each emo-
tion type (negative or neutral) and for each type of de-
tail being assessed (memory for visual details or memory
for task performed). Conjunction analyses (using the
masking function in SPM) were then used to examine
what regions showed activation across two or more
contrasts, and interaction analyses were performed to
reveal what regions showed a greater correspondence
to subsequent memory performance for one emotion
type than for the other. All activations are presented in
neurological coordinates (i.e., activity on the right hemi-
sphere is presented on the right side of the brain
images). Voxel coordinates are reported in Talairach
coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and the cen-
ter voxel was identified within the cluster of activation.
Event-related time-courses were extracted from active
clusters by creating regions of interest (ROI), including
all significant voxels within an 8-mm radius of each
chosen maximum voxel, using the ROI toolbox imple-
mented in SPM (written by Russell Poldrack). Within
Figure 1. At encoding, participants saw negative and neutral objects,
each presented for 1 sec. They were asked to judge either whether the
object would fit inside of a filing cabinet drawer or whether the object was
living. At retrieval, participants saw some objects that were identical to a
studied item (same), others that shared the same verbal label but that
were a different exemplar of the item (similar), and others that had not
been studied (new). Half of the same and similar objects had been
studied with the fit task, and half had been studied with the living task.
Participants indicated whether the object was ‘‘same,’’ ‘‘similar,’’ or ‘‘new,’’
and for items judged to be ‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar,’’ participants indicated
which of the two judgments had been made about the item (fit or living).
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 1875each of these ROIs, a hemodynamic response function
was calculated for each individual subject and for each
condition type (relative to fixation baseline) as a func-
tion of peristimulus time (0–20 sec). Statistics were
performed on the sum of the signal change within peri-
stimulus times 4–10 sec. These signal change values are
displayed in the figures. Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was performed on these extracted signal change values
to examine whether the ROIs showed an interaction
between memory accuracy and emotion type (e.g.,
activity relating to memory for the details of an emo-
tional item but not for details of a neutral item, or vice
versa), between memory accuracy and detail type (e.g.,
activity relating to memory for visual detail but not to
memory for the task performed, or vice-versa), or
among all three factors.
RESULTS
Both behavioral and neuroimaging data were analyzed
with participants’ sex as a factor. No effects of sex were
revealed, and so all reported analyses collapse together
data from men and women.
Behavioral Results
As in previous studies using variants of this paradigm
(Kensinger etal.,2006; Garoffetal., 2005),weconsidered
‘‘same’’ responses to a same s t u d i e di t e mt or e f l e c t
memoryforspecificvisualdetails(‘‘specificrecognition’’)
and ‘‘similar’’ responses to a same studied item to in-
dicate memory for some (but not all) aspects of the
studied item (‘‘nonspecific recognition’’). ‘‘New’’ re-
sponses to same items, in contrast, reflected a complete
miss (i.e., participants did not remember that the partic-
ular type of item had previously been studied; refer to
Methods for a more detailed discussion of the study
design logic). Consistent with a prior behavioral study
(Kensinger et al., 2006), negative items were more likely
to be remembered with specific visual detail than were
neutral items. Thus, specific recognition rates (saying
‘‘same’’ to a same item) were significantly higher for neg-
ative items (51%) than for neutral items [46%, t(19) =
3.58, p < .01; see Table 1]. No effects of emotion were
noted for responses given to similar or new items ( p >
.15). Also consistent with a prior study (Kensinger &
Schacter, 2006a), the likelihood of remembering the
task performed with the item (whether it would fit in a
drawer or whether it was a living thing) was not affected
by the emotional content of the item (p > .15; see
Table 2).
It is important to note that participants’ performance
onthetaskwasgood,despitethelargenumberofstudied
items. If performing at chance, participants would have
been equally likely to give ‘‘same,’’ ‘‘similar,’’ or ‘‘new’’
responsestosameitems,andthey wouldhavegiveneach
type of response 33% of the time. Instead, participants
gave ‘‘same’’ responses to same items significantly more
than 33% of the time. Moreover, they were least likely to
call a same item ‘‘new,’’ were somewhat more likely to
call a same item ‘‘similar,’’ and were most likely to call a
same item ‘‘same.’’ Thus, the large number of studied
items allowed us to analyze all responses to same items
(i.e., resulted in a sufficient number of ‘‘new,’’ ‘‘similar,’’
and‘‘same’’responsestosameitems),butdidnotleadto
memory performance that approached chance.
Subsequent-Memory fMRI Results
If we consider ‘‘same’’ and ‘‘similar’’ responses to same
items to reflect at least some memory for the studied
items, and ‘‘new’’ responses to same items to reflect for-
getting of the studied item, then comparing (‘‘same’’ +
‘‘similar’’) > ‘‘new’’ responses to same items gives us a
way to examine the standard subsequent-memory effect
(i.e., later remembered > later forgotten) for the emo-
tional and the neutral items. We performed a conjunc-
tion analysis to examine the regions that showed this
Table 1. Proportion [mean (SE)] of Items Given a ‘‘Same,’’
‘‘Similar,’’ or ‘‘New’’ Response as a Function of Item Type
(Same, Similar,o rNew) and Emotion Type (Neutral or
Negative Arousing)
Response Same Similar New
Neutral
‘‘Same’’ 0.46 (0.02) 0.14 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
‘‘Similar’’ 0.29 (0.02) 0.41 (0.04) 0.19 (0.04)
‘‘New’’ 0.25 (0.03) 0.45 (0.03) 0.79 (0.03)
Negative Arousing
‘‘Same’’ 0.51 (0.02) 0.14 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02)
‘‘Similar’’ 0.26 (0.04) 0.44 (0.03) 0.20 (0.03)
‘‘New’’ 0.22 (0.03) 0.42 (0.02) 0.77 (0.03)
Table 2. Proportion [mean (SE)] of Items Attributed to
the Correct Study Task as a Function of Item Type (Same,
Similar), Response Type (‘‘Same,’’ ‘‘Similar’’), and Emotion
Type (Neutral, Negative Arousing)
Response Same Similar
Neutral
‘‘Same’’ 0.66 (0.02) 0.65 (0.04)
‘‘Similar’’ 0.58 (0.03) 0.62 (0.03)
Negative Arousing
‘‘Same’’ 0.68 (0.03) 0.70 (0.03)
‘‘Similar’’ 0.61 (0.04) 0.66 (0.02)
1876 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 19, Number 11subsequent-memory effect for both the negative and
neutral items. We created a mask of the regions revealed
in the contrast of subsequent (‘‘same’’ + ‘‘similar’’) >
‘‘new’’ responses to same neutral items and then ap-
plied that mask to the contrast of subsequent (‘‘same’’ +
‘‘similar’’) > ‘‘new’’ responses to same negative items
to reveal only regions that were active in both contrasts.
The individual contrasts included in the conjunction
analysis were analyzed at a threshold of p <. 0 1 ,u n c o r -
rected and with a 5-voxel extent, so that the conjoint
probability of the conjunction analysis was p < .001,
uncorrected (Lazar, Luna, Sweeney, & Eddy, 2002; Fisher,
1950). We also performed a whole-brain interaction
analysis to examine the regions that showed a stronger
relation to subsequent-memory for the negative items
than for the neutral items [i.e., (‘‘same’’ + ‘‘similar’’) >
‘‘new’’ to same negative items > (‘‘same’’ + ‘‘similar’’) >
‘‘new’’ to same neutral items]. This interaction analysis
was conducted at a standard threshold of p <. 0 0 1a n d
revealed regions with at least a 5-voxel extent. As reported
in Table 3, we found a fronto-temporal network of re-
gions that related to memory for negative arousing and
neutral items (consistent with regions implicated in many
subsequent-memory paradigms; see Paller & Wagner, 2002
for review) and we found that activity in the amygdala,
ventrolateral/orbito-frontal prefrontal cortex, hippocam-
pus, and parahippocampal gyrus showed a stronger rela-
tion to subsequent memory for the negative arousing
items than for the neutral items. These regions are very
consistent with those shown in previous studies to be
more predictive of successful encoding of emotional
information than of neutral information (e.g., Kensinger
& Schacter, 2005a; Dolcos et al., 2004; reviewed by LaBar
& Cabeza, 2006).
Although it was heartening to replicate the standard
subsequent-memory effects using a paradigm that dif-
fered from those previously employed to examine emo-
tional memory, the main goals of this study were to
move beyond an understanding of the regions that re-
late to memory for general information about a negative
item’s presentation (i.e., the ability to know whether or
not a general type of negative item was studied) and to
instead examine the neural processes that lead to effects
of negative emotion on memory for detail. In particular,
we had two main questions of interest. First, what neural
processes correspond with a participant’s ability to suc-
cessfully encode the specific visual details of a presented
negative item? Second, what are the neural mechanisms
through which emotion exerts focal effects on memory?
Analyses relevant to each of these questions are outlined
below.
Effects of Negative Emotion on Memory for
Visual Detail
We first conducted a conjunction analysis to examine
the regions that corresponded with subsequent specific
Table 3. Regions in Which Neural Activity Was Greater during
the Encoding of Items that Participants Would Later Remember
(‘‘Same’’ or ‘‘Similar’’ Responses to Same Items) than during
the Encoding of Items that Participants Would Later Forget







Relation to Subsequent Memory for Negative and Neutral Items
Middle frontal gyrus 10 30, 56, 17
Inferior temporal gyrus 37 48, 59, 10
37 53, 64, 4
Fusiform gyrus 37 48, 52, 5
37 27, 50, 5
20 21, 32, 14
Parahippocampal gyrus 36 18, 7, 22
36 32, 8, 25
36 30, 8, 35
Hippocampus N/A 36, 21, 20
36, 15, 17
21, 9, 20
Striatum N/A 18, 3, 12
21, 5, 15
Relation to Subsequent Memory for Negative but not for
Neutral Items
Superior frontal gyrus 8 12, 29, 46
Inferior frontal gyrus
(orbito-frontal/ventrolateral)
10/47 35, 41, 0
Postcentral gyrus 4 30, 6, 28
Inferior parietal lobe 40 30, 37, 25
Inferior temporal gyrus 37 56, 61, 2
20 33, 2, 35
Fusiform gyrus 19/37 50, 67, 7
37 41, 56, 5
38 29, 36, 13
Parahippocampal gyrus 36 30, 5, 33
Hippocampus N/A 38, 21, 14
Amygdala N/A 33, 4, 25
Striatum N/A 27, 0, 6
3, 7, 16
6, 25, 15
Cerebellum N/A 32, 39, 21
All regions consist of at least 5 voxels.
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 1877recognition for both negative and neutral items (i.e.,
regions in which activity was greater during the encod-
ing of same items later given a ‘‘same’’ response than
during the encoding of same items later given a ‘‘sim-
ilar’’ response). To perform this conjunction analysis, we
created a mask of the regions revealed in the contrast of
specific > nonspecific recognition of neutral items and
then applied that mask to the contrast of specific >
nonspecific recognition of negative items. The individual
contrasts included in the conjunction analysis were
analyzed at a threshold of p < .01, uncorrected and
with a 5-voxel extent (such that the conjoint probability
of the conjunction analysis, using Fisher’s estimate
[Lazar et al., 2002; Fisher, 1950], was p < .001, uncor-
rected). Consistent with our hypothesis (and with re-
sults from Garoff et al., 2005 who investigated
mnemonic specificity for neutral items), activity in the
right fusiform gyrus (BA 37, Talairach coordinates: 34,
42, 21) showed this correspondence to subsequent
specific recognition. In addition, this analysis revealed
that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9,
Talairach coordinates: 4, 45, 32), in two regions of
the left prefrontal cortex (BA 9/46, Talairach coordi-
nates: 48, 36, 18; BA 8/9, Talairach coordinates: 42,
20, 41), and in a region of the right superior parietal
lobule (BA 7, Talairach coordinates: 29, 65, 35) also
was related to specific recognition for negative and
neutral items (see red regions depicted in Figure 2).
We extracted the signal change values from the right
fusiform region (an ROI consisting of 23 voxels) and
conducted an ANOVA with emotion type as a factor
with two levels [negative arousing, neutral] and with
memory specificity as a factor with three levels [later
remembered with visual specificity (‘‘same’’ response);
later remembered with only general, nonspecific infor-
mation (‘‘similar’’ response); later forgotten (‘‘new’’ re-
sponse)]. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of memory
specificity and an interaction between memory specific-
ity and emotion [F(2, 18) = 7.15, p < .05]. The main
effect of memory specificity reflected the fact that
activity in this region of the right fusiform gyrus showed
a correspondence to specific > nonspecific recognition
for both negative [t(19) = 3.83, p < .001] and neutral
objects [t(19) = 2.01, p < .05], whereas it showed no
correspondence to memory for nonspecific information
(i.e., signal change for items later remembered with
nonspecific detail was no greater than signal change
for items later forgotten). However, as indicated by the
significant interaction between emotion type and mem-
ory specificity, the relation of this region to specific
recognition was stronger for the negative items than
for the neutral items (see red bar graph in Figure 3).
T h u s ,e v e ni nar e g i o nt h a tw a si m p o r t a n tf o rt h e
encoding of specific visual detail for all items, there
was a heightened correspondence to encoding specific-
ity for the emotional items.





recognition for all items
(red regions), for negative
items but not for neutral
items (green regions), and
for neutral items but not for
negative items (blue regions).
Signal changes from the
regions of the fusiform
gyrus outlined in yellow
are depicted in Figure 3.
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formed a random-effects interaction analysis to reveal
the regions that were more active during the processing
of same emotional items that would later be recognized
with specific visual detail than during the processing
of same neutral items that would later be recognized
with specific visual detail, that is, (specific > nonspecific
for negative) > (specific > nonspecific for neutral). At
a threshold of p < .001, uncorrected and requiring a
5-voxel extent of activation, this analysis revealed activity
in a region of the right fusiform gyrus just medial and
superior to the region that emerged in the conjunction
analysis (BA 37, Talairach coordinates: 27, 42, 15; see
green region and bar graph in Figure 3, depicting activity
from a 26-voxel ROI) as well as activity in the superior
temporal gyrus (BA 22, Talairach coordinates: 33, 40,
12) and in the orbito-frontal cortex (BA 11/47, Talairach
coordinates: 26, 43, 15; green regions in Figure 2).
We also examined the regions that showed the re-
verse pattern of response: a greater correspondence to
specific recognition for the neutral items than for the
negative items. No regions within the fusiform gyrus
were identified by this analysis; rather, the analysis re-
vealed activity in the left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40,
Talairach coordinates: 51, 30, 46), the precuneus
(BA 7, Talairach coordinates: 6, 46, 55), the striatum
(Talairach coordinates: 22, 12, 6), and the cerebellum
(1, 70, 10; blue regions in Figure 2).
The results described above were consistent with our
hypothesis that negative items are more likely to be
remembered with visual detail than neutral items be-
cause of enhanced visual processing during encoding.
We next wanted to examine whether there was evidence
that interactions between the amygdala and the fusiform
gyrus were important for this enhancement. To address
this question, we defined the amygdala in an unbiased
fashion, from a contrast comparing the processing of all
items to the baseline fixation periods. A large region of
the right amygdala was revealed in this contrast (see
Figure 4); SPM noted two distinct clusters of activation
within this large swath of activity, a more ventral region
(consisting of 26 voxels) and a more dorsal region
(consisting of 17 voxels). Interestingly, there were no
significant clusters of activity within the left amygdala at
a standard threshold ( p < .001 and 5 voxels). There
currently is much discussion about laterality effects in
the amygdala, and it is not clear why amygdala activity in
this study would be predominantly right-lateralized (see
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Cahill, 2003, for further
discussion). This laterality effect was consistent for men
and women, and is consistent with right-lateralized ac-
tivation shown in other studies that have used similar ob-
ject stimuli (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 2005a, 2005b).
To examine whether the right amygdala activity was
related to subsequent memory for visual details, we
conducted separate ANOVAs on the encoding-related
signal change within each region of the right amygdala.
We included subsequent memory specificity as a factor
with three levels (later recognized the specific details of
the same item [‘‘same’’ response], later recognized only
the general features of the same item [‘‘similar’’ re-
sponse], later forgotten [‘‘new’’ response]), and emo-
tion as a factor with two levels (negative, neutral).
Critically, for each amygdalar region, this ANOVA re-
vealed an interaction between memory specificity and
emotion [for the ventral region, F(2, 18) = 48.96, p <
.001; for the dorsal region, F(2, 18) = 32.57, p < .001].
As can be seen in the solid yellow bar graph in Figure 4,
both regions of the right amygdala showed greater
activity during the encoding of negative items that later
would be recognized with specific detail than during the
encoding of negative items that later would be recog-
nized with only general features [i.e., ‘‘same’’ > ‘‘similar,’’
both t(19) > 5.5, p <. 0 0 1 ] .
1 Both regions of the right
amygdala also showed greater activity during the encod-
ing of negative items that later would be recognized with
at least general features than during the encoding of nega-
tive items that later would be forgotten [i.e., ‘‘similar’’ >
Figure 3. Signal changes in the regions of the right fusiform gyrus that were found to correspond with specific recognition for both negative
and neutral items (depicted in red; Talairach coordinates: 34, 42, 21) or with specific recognition only for negative items and not for neutral
items (depicted in green; Talairach coordinates: 27, 42, 15). Bar graphs represent the signal change during the encoding of same items
that were later recognized with specific visual detail (‘‘same’’ response), recognized without specific visual detail (‘‘similar’’ response), or
completely forgotten (‘‘new’’ response). Asterisks represent significant differences in signal change ( p < .05).
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 1879‘‘new’’, both t(19) > 3.8, p < .001; see Table 4 for all
regions that showed this correspondence to ‘‘similar’’ >
‘‘new’’ responses to same items]. These findings are
consistent with prior evidence that amygdala activity at
encoding can correspond not only with the ability to
remember that an item was previously presented (re-
viewed by Kensinger, in press; Hamann, 2001) but also
with the ability to remember at least some details of that
Figure 4. Regions of the amygdala were defined from the contrast of all images > fixation. This analyses revealed two regions within the
amygdala: One region in the right dorsal amygdala (region outlined in yellow; Talairach coordinates 21, 3, 12) and one region in the right
ventral amygdala (region outlined in blue; Talairach coordinates 24, 2, 25; panel A). As shown by the solid yellow (upper panel of B) and
solid blue (upper panel of C) bar graphs, activity in both regions of the right amygdala corresponded with subsequent specific recognition of
negative items: Activity was greater during the encoding of same negative items later given a ‘‘same’’ response than during the encoding of
same negative items later given a ‘‘similar’’ response ( p < .001). Amygdala activity also corresponded with the likelihood of remembering at least
the general features of a negative item (greater activity during encoding of negative items later given a ‘‘similar’’ response than during encoding
of negative items later given a ‘‘new’’ response; p < .001). Amygdala activity showed no relation to memory for the neutral items. In contrast
to the relation between amygdala activity and the visual specificity of a memory (i.e., ‘‘same’’ > ‘‘similar’’ for negative items), amygdala activity
showed no correspondence to memory for the decision made about a negative item. As shown in the comparison between the task-correct
(solid bar) and task-incorrect (slashed bar) conditions (in the lower panels of B and C), activity in the amygdala was equally high for negative
items remembered with or without the correct task assignment.
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contrast, the right amygdala showed no correspondence
to successful encoding of neutral items (all p >. 2 5 ) .
Although these results demonstrated a role for the
amygdala in the encoding of visual specifics, we were
interested in examining whether there was any evidence
that this relation to memory for visually specific infor-
mation stemmed from interactions between the amyg-
dala and visual processing regions. To address this
question, we computed correlations between the activity
in the two regions of the right amygdala defined from
the contrast of all > fixation (i.e., the two regions in
Figure 4) and activity in the right fusiform region that
had been shown to be selectively implicated in the
subsequent specific recognition of negative items (i.e.,
the fusiform region depicted in green in Figure 3).
During the encoding of negative items that later were
remembered with specific visual detail, robust correla-
tions were revealed (r = .67, p < .001 in the dorsal
amygdala; r = .66, p < .01 in the ventral amygdala;
Figure 5). Importantly, no such correlations existed
during the encoding of negative items that were for-
gotten ( p > .25), or during the encoding of any neutral
items ( p > .25), and there was a significant difference
in the strength of the correlations for the negative
items that later were remembered with specific detail
and for the other types of items (all Fisher’s z > 2.32,
p < .05). These results provided suggestive evidence
for affective modulation of sensory processing: The
individuals who showed the most robust amygdala
activity during the visually specific encoding of the
negative items also were the individuals who showed
the most fusiform activity during the encoding of those
items.
Encoding Processes that Correspond with Focal
Effects of Negative Emotion on Memory
Our first question with regard to the focal effects of
emotion on memory was whether amygdala activity
would correspond with memory for any type of detail
from the encoding episode, or only with memory for
the intrinsic detail (the visual details of the object, as
described above) and not with memory for an extrinsic
detail (the decision made about the object at encoding).
If amygdala activity enhances encoding of all event de-
tails, then not only should amygdala activity show a
correspondence to subsequent memory for visual detail,
it also should show a relation to subsequent memory
for the task performed with the item. If, in contrast,
Table 4. Regions in Which Neural Activity Was Greater during
the Encoding of Items that Participants Would Later Remember
with General Item Features (‘‘Similar’’ Response to Same







‘‘Similar’’ > ‘‘New’’ for Negative and Neutral Items
Middle frontal gyrus 6 36, 4, 30
‘‘Similar’’ > ‘‘New’’ for Negative but not Neutral Items
Middle frontal gyrus 10 31, 56, 18
Inferior frontal gyrus 47 42, 38, 2
47 48, 36, 2
11/47 21, 40, 2
44 48, 7, 14
Inferior parietal lobe 7/40 27, 38, 28
Lingual gyrus 17 20, 81, 10
Amygdala N/A 28, 4, 25
All regions consist of at least 5 voxels, active at a threshold of p < .001,
uncorrected.
Figure 5. Activity in regions of the dorsal (top) and ventral (bottom)
right amygdala correlated with activity in the right fusiform gyrus
during the encoding of negative items that later would be remembered
with specific visual detail. These results suggest that interactions
between the amygdala and visual processing regions have important
implications for the visual specificity with which negative information
is remembered.
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 1881amygdala activity primarily enhances a person’s ability to
remember details intrinsic to an item (such as its visual
details), then the amygdala should show a selective re-
lation to memory for visual details and not to memory
for the task performed with an item.
To distinguish these alternatives, we computed the
signal change, in the two regions of the right amygdala
defined above, for negative and neutral items that were
remembered with (a) both specific visual detail and task
information (i.e., a ‘‘same’’ response to a same item and
correct task selection), (b) specific visual detail but not
task information (i.e., a ‘‘same’’ response to a same item
and incorrect task selection), (c) task information but not
specific detail (i.e., a ‘‘similar’’ response to a same item
and correct task selection), and (d) neither task informa-
tion nor specific visual detail (i.e., a ‘‘similar’’ response to
a same item and incorrect task selection). We then
conducted an ANOVA on these signal change values with
visual specificity as a factor with two levels (visual spec-
ificityofmemorypresent—i.e.,‘‘same’’responsegivento
same item; visual specificity of memory absent—i.e.,
‘‘similar’’ response give to same item), task accuracy as
a factor with two levels (task decision correct, task
decision incorrect), and emotion type as a factor with
two levels (negative arousing, neutral). This ANOVA re-
vealed a significant effect of visual specificity [F(1, 19) =
31.01, p < .001 for the dorsal region; F(1, 19) = 30.67,
p<.001fortheventralregion]andaninteractionbetween
visual specificity and emotion [F(1, 19) = 19.72, p <. 0 0 1
for the dorsal region; F(1, 19) = 43.43, p <. 0 0 1f o rt h e
ventralregion].Incontrast,neitherregionofthe amygdala
showed a main effect of task accuracy, nor an interaction
between task accuracy and emotion (p > .25). These
results emphasize that although these regions of the right
amygdala show a relation to memory for visual detail for
negative arousing items, they show no correspondence to
memoryforthetaskperformedwiththenegativearousing
items. This pattern of results is made clear in Figure 4, in
the bar graphs in the bottom of panels B and C. Although
amygdalaactivitywasgreaterforitemslatergivena‘‘same’’
response than for items later given a ‘‘similar’’ response
(reflecting a correspondence to memory for visual detail),
amygdala activity was no greater for items later attributed
to the correct task than to items later attributed to the
incorrecttask.Awhole-brainanalysisconfirmedthat,when
holding constant the level of visual detail later remem-
bered about an item, no region of the amygdala was more
activeduringtheencodingofitemslaterrememberedwith
correcttaskinformationthanduringtheencodingofitems
later remembered without correct task information; even
when the threshold was dropped to p <. 0 5 ,t h e r ew a sn o
evidence of a correspondence between amygdala activity
and memory for task information. This result converges
with prior findings (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006a) in
demonstrating that there are regions of the amygdala in
which activity during encoding does not enhance memory
for all details of an encoding episode.
To examine the network of regions that may lead to fo-
cal effects of emotion on memory (i.e., enhancing memory
for some details but leaving memory for other details
Figure 6. Activity in the right orbitofrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate gyrus, and caudate nucleus corresponded with successful
encoding of negative items’ visual details and with unsuccessful
encoding of the task performed with the negative items (A). A distinct
network including the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior
cingulate gyrus, and left inferior temporal gyrus showed the same
correspondence for neutral items (B).
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the masking function in SPM (as described above), to
examine the encoding processes that led to successful
encoding of the visual details of a negative item but not to
successful encoding of the task performed with an item
(i.e., subsequent specific > nonspecific recognition AND
task incorrect > task correct for negative items only).
This conjunction analysis revealed activity in the
orbito-frontal cortex (BA 10/11, Talairach coordinates:
20, 58, 9), in the anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24,
Talairach coordinates: 11, 23, 10), and in the caudate
(Talairach coordinates: 18, 22, 4; Figure 6A). This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that attentional pro-
cesses at encoding serve to focus attention on the visual
or intrinsic attributes of a negative item while divert-
ing resources from processing information that is extrin-
sic to the item, such as the task being performed with
the item.
The comparable conjunction analysis conducted for
the neutral items revealed no regions when each con-
trast was analyzed with the standard threshold used for
conjunction analyses ( p < .01). When the threshold of
each contrast was lowered to p < .05, the analysis
revealed a large region of the right dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (BA 9/46, Talairach coordinates: 40, 28, 30),
the posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24, Talairach coordi-
nates: 15, 17, 42), the left lateral parietal lobe (BA 40,
Talairach coordinates: 48, 28, 46), and the lateral
inferior temporal gyrus (BA 21, Talairach coordinates:
50, 20, 14; Figure 6B). Although these regions also
are consistent with an attentional network, it is interest-
ing to note that there is no overlap between the regions
identified in the conjunction for the negative items and
those revealed in the conjunction for the neutral items.
DISCUSSION
The primary goal of the present experiment was to
assess the neural processes that underlie participants’
enhanced ability to remember the visual details of a
negative item. The secondary goal was to examine the
neural mechanisms that lead to focal effects of emotion
on memory for visual detail. With regard to the primary
goal, the results indicate that this emotion-related en-
hancement in memory for visual detail results from
enhancement in visual processing, particularly in the
right fusiform gyrus. Activity in the right amygdala also
corresponded with memory for visual detail, indicating
that amygdala engagement can serve not only to in-
crease memory for ‘‘gist’’ (see Adolphs et al., 2005 for
further discussion) but also to enhance memory for vi-
sual detail. A strong correlation between right amygdala
activity and right fusiform activity during the encoding of
negative objects suggests an important contribution of
interactions between these regions in modulating the
effect of emotion on the visual specificity of object
memory. In regard to the secondary goal, the results
revealed that there are regions of the amygdala in which
activity during encoding does not necessitate the suc-
cessful encoding of all event details. Moreover, activity
within the orbito-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus,
and caudate nucleus corresponded with the ability to
remember an item’s visual detail but not the task
performed with the item. This network of regions over-
laps extensively with a network implicated in the detec-
tion of unattended emotional information (Vuilleumier,
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001), suggesting that the rel-
atively automatic or prioritized processing of emotional
items may assist in the encoding of some intrinsic item
attributes but may not benefit encoding of other, more
extrinsic, details of an emotional item’s presentation.
Each of these findings will be expanded upon below.
Emotion’s Modulation of Memory for Visual Detail
The present study provided evidence that the previously
shown emotion-induced enhancement in memory for
the exact visual details of an item (Kensinger et al., 2006)
results from modulation of the same visual processes
(mediated by the right fusiform gyrus) known to con-
tribute to the specificity of visual priming effects (e.g.,
Koutstaal et al., 2001) and to the encoding and subse-
quent recognition of specific details of nonemotional
items (Garoff et al., 2005). In particular, activity in the
right fusiform gyrus corresponded with memory for the
specific visual details of both negative and neutral items.
Moreover, the right fusiform gyrus was more active, both
in extent and in magnitude, during the encoding of
negative items later recognized with specific visual detail
than during the encoding of neutral items later recog-
nized with specific detail. Thus, negative content
seemed to enhance the visual processes that typically
boost memory for specific information. Visual priming,
encoding of nonemotional items, and encoding of emo-
tional items depend, to some extent, on different un-
derlying neural mechanisms, but our results highlight
that engagement of the right fusiform contributes to
each of these seemingly distinct effects. Based on this
strengthening empirical foundation, an important task
for future research is to identify precisely the right
fusiform computations that contribute to visual memory
specificity in different domains.
A strong correlation between the amount of activity in
the right amygdala and in the right fusiform gyrus during
the encoding of negative items later remembered with
specific visual detail suggests that interactions between
these regions may underlie this enhancement. There is
abundant evidence that the amygdala can influence
processing throughout the ventral visual processing
stream, enhancing the processing of emotionally relevant
stimuli (Sugase, Yamane, Ueno, & Kawano, 1999; Amaral,
Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992). Fusiform activ-
ity often is greater during the processing of fearful faces
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 1883compared to neutral faces (Vuilleumier et al., 2001;
Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996), and correlations
have been noted between the amount of activity in the
amygdala and the amount of activity in the fusiform cor-
tex during viewing of emotional information (Vuilleumier
et al., 2001). Based on the speed of the anatomical
connections between the amygdala and visual processing
regions, there is reason to believe that at least part of the
modulation occurs via the amygdala’s influence on sen-
sory processing (Amaral et al., 1992). Moreover, a neuro-
imaging study examining fusiform activation to fearful
facial expressions in patients with varying amounts of
damage to the amygdala showed a correlation between
the amount of amygdalar preservation and the amount of
fusiform activity (Vuilleumier et al., 2004).
Although the results of the present study cannot rule
out the possible importance of fusiform modulation of
amygdalar function, or of joint modulation of each of
these regions by a third party, the results provide sug-
gestive evidence that emotion’s modulation of encoding
processes can occur not only through interactions be-
tween the amygdala and the hippocampal formation
(see Phelps, 2004, for a recent review) but also through
interactions between the amygdala and sensory process-
ing regions. Thus, amygdala–fusiform interactions,
which have primarily been discussed within the context
of emotion’s ability to modulate attention and visual
perception (see Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Davis &
Whalen, 2001) also may influence mnemonic perfor-
mance. This conclusion makes functional sense given
that items in the environment that are more likely to be
d e t e c t e da n da t t e n d e da l s ow i l lh a v ea ni n c r e a s e d
chance of being remembered (see Kensinger, 2004;
Phelps, 2004, for recent reviews). The present results
further suggest that this modulation of perceptual pro-
cessing confers a particular advantage in remembering
the exact visual features of an emotional item.
This conclusion fits nicely with the clinical literature
examining memory in individuals who have experienced
a traumatic event, such as being held up at gunpoint.
Many of these individuals report incredibly vivid mem-
ories for salient aspects of the event, such as the details
of the gun held by the perpetrator (see Kensinger et al.,
2007; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). This study suggests that
it may be amygdalar–fusiform interactions that underlie
at least some of this boost in memory for the visual
specifics of an emotional object in the environment.
Neural Underpinnings of Negative Emotion’s Focal
Effects on Memory
Although particular aspects of an event may be remem-
bered with rich detail due to the event’s negatively
emotional content, negative emotion does not always
enhance memory for all event details. Many researchers
have discussed focal effects of emotion on memory
in terms of tradeoffs (see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004;
Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002), whereby some aspects of
an event are better remembered because of the event’s
emotional content, whereas other details are more likely
to be forgotten. However, as demonstrated in the
present study, there also are situations in which negative
emotion appears to selectively enhance memory for
some details while leaving memory for other episodic
details relatively unaffected. In terms of the neural
processes that lead to these focal effects of emotion
on memory, the present study revealed that there are
regions within the right amygdala that correspond with
successful memory for some, but not all, details of a
negative item’s presentation. In particular, two regions
of the right amygdala consistently were more active
during the encoding of negative items that later would
be remembered than during the encoding of negative
items that later would be forgotten, and these regions
also showed a relation to later memory for the visual
details of the negative items’ presentations. Activity in
these right amygdalar regions, however, was unrelated
to memory for the task performed with the negative
items. Although it is possible that there are other
regions of the amygdala, not revealed in the current
study, that show a correspondence to successful encod-
ing of a wider range of episodic details, these data em-
phasize that there are regions of the amygdala for which
engagement does not lead to successful encoding of all
details present during an encoding episode.
Note also that in the present paradigm, amygdala ac-
tivity tracked with behavioral performance. Two regions
within the right amygdala showed a subsequent-memory
relation for the visual details of a negative item, a type of
information that was more likely to be remembered
when the item was negative than when it was neutral.
In contrast, their activity did not correspond with later
memory for the task performed with a negative item, a
detail that was equally likely to be remembered for
emotional and for neutral items. Future studies will be
required to elucidate whether there tends to be a one-
to-one correspondence between behavioral memory
enhancement and amygdala engagement during encod-
ing, or whether there are instances in which amygdala
engagement modulates successful encoding of item de-
tails despite no overall effect of emotion on the likeli-
hood of remembering that detail (and see Sharot et al.,
2004, for some evidence that amygdala activity can relate
to memory performance even in the absence of overall
memory-enhancing effects of emotion).
These data emphasize that activity within at least
some regions of the amygdala can be differentially
associated with memory for different types of details,
enhancing memory for some aspects of an item’s pre-
sentation while having no enhancing effect on memory
for other aspects. But clearly, the amygdala is not acting
in isolation. The present study revealed that activity in a
network of regions previously implicated in the priori-
tized processing of emotional stimuli (Vuilleumier et al.,
1884 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 19, Number 112001) facilitated the encoding of a negative item’s visual
detail but did not enhance the encoding of the task
performed with the item. The regions identified (orbito-
frontal cortex, ventral striatum, and anterior cingulate
gyrus) often are found to be brought on-line when a
task requires engagement of motivational processes and
of attention to affective stimuli (e.g., Everitt, Cardinal,
Hall, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2000; Schultz, Tremblay, &
Hollerman, 2000; Robbins & Everitt, 1996). Thus, the
correspondence of these regions to a selective enhance-
ment in encoding of an intrinsic item attribute is con-
sistent with the proposal that at least some of the focal
effects of emotion on memory arise from the prioritized
processing and attentional focusing on negative items
during encoding. Attentional focusing on the item also
can occur for nonemotional information, as suggested
by the fact that activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, posterior cingulate gyrus, and lateral parietal
lobule corresponded with memory for the visual specif-
ics of, but not the task performed with, neutral items.
However, the focus on emotional items appears to
result through an affective-oriented guidance of attention
rather than through other mechanisms of attention medi-
ated by classic fronto-parietal networks (see Dolan &
Vuilleumier, 2003, for more discussion).
Although the exact mechanism through which this
affective attention network exerts its effects remains to
be specified, it is likely that activity in these regions mod-
ulates the functioning of other sensory or mnemonic
processing systems (see Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). A
recent neuroimaging study examining retrieval of in-
formation studied in neutral or emotional contexts pro-
vided evidence that orbito-frontal activity could guide
retrieval processes, modulating the strength of amygdala–
hippocampal connections (Smith, Stephan, Rugg, & Dolan,
2006). It is plausible that just as the orbito-frontal cortex
can guide retrieval processes, so might it focus and guide
encoding processes.
Conclusions
In summary, the present results indicate that individuals
are more likely to remember the visual details of nega-
tive items because of enhanced visual processing of
those stimuli during encoding: The right fusiform gyrus
showed enhanced activity, both in extent and in magni-
tude, during the encoding of negative items later re-
membered with visual detail. The results suggested that
at least part of this modulation of visual processing
stemmed from engagement of affective processing re-
gions: Two regions of the right amygdala showed a
strong correspondence to memory for a negative item’s
visual details, and their activity was correlated with
activity in the right fusiform gyrus. Thus, emotion’s mod-
ulation of encoding processes appears to occur not only
through interactions between the amygdala and the
hippocampal formation (see Phelps, 2004, for recent
review) but also through interactions between the
amygdala and sensory processing regions. Moreover,
activity in an affective-attentional network (the orbito-
frontal cortex, striatum, and anterior cingulate gyrus)
corresponded with enhanced memory for the visual
details of a negative item. This affective processing did
not, however, lead to the successful encoding of all
details of an item’s presentation. Activity in these affec-
tive processing regions showed no correspondence (in
the case of the amygdala) or a negative relation (in the
case of the orbito-frontal cortex, striatum, and anterior
cingulate gyrus) to the successful encoding of the task
performed with an item. These results suggest that at
least part of the reason for the focal effects of emotion
on memory stem from encoding factors (see Reisberg &
Heuer, 2004): The more affectively focused individuals
are on an emotional item, the more likely they are to
remember intrinsic item attributes (such as the visual
details of an item), but the less likely they are to re-
member details extrinsic to the item (such as the task
performed with the item).
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Note
1. These ROI analyses revealed a correspondence between
amygdala activity and visual specificity of memory for negative
items but not for neutral items. Although, at a standard
threshold, the whole-brain interaction analysis had not revealed
amygdala activation, when the statistical threshold of that
interaction analysiswasloweredtop<.05,activation withinthe
right dorsal amygdala (8 voxels) and ventral amygdala (6 voxels)
was revealed. The pattern of activation within these regions
paralleled those revealed in the dorsal and ventral amygdala
ROIs, in terms of both overall signal change patterns and
correlations with fusiform activity.
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